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RISDIC 1 1 31 i
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the district court correctly ruled that the defendant hospital is not
l i i h l c II mi11 I ni mi mi ni I i I ] " 1 ' II mi I I

ill i n ni ni 1 mi i ill

' in mi ni ill

s I ni mi i l i i l I n * ( ' H I

i . i i u s n l l I n i In i II i l l . Il in ill I I n

edge of the mat was suddenly lifted by the wind, because the hospital admittedly had no
prior notice of a dangerous condition.
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procedures, and was decided in favor of the defendant hospital. (R, 43, 14 \ 296.)
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS

governed by case law, discussed herein. The second issue is governed by Rule 11, which
is set forth verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 10.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a premises liability action arising out of plaintiff s fall on an outside
doormat at the defendant hospital. Plaintiff fell when a sudden gust of wind allegedly
blew the edge of the mat into her legs and caused her to fall. (R. 1, 48; Amend. Br. of
App. 8.) The hospital moved for summary judgment on the basis that it had no prior
notice of a dangerous condition. (R. 91-100.) Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment on the undisputed facts, also requesting sanctions for alleged
violation of Rule 11. (R. 130-46.) The district court granted the hospital's motion,
denied plaintiffs motion, and also denied her request for sanctions. (R. 294, Add. 1.)
Plaintiff appealed from that final order of summary judgment. (R. 300.) The Utah
Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As plaintiff concedes, the material facts are not in dispute. (Amend. Br. of App.
10.)
On a windy day in March 1995, around midday, plaintiff went to Cottonwood
Hospital to visit her doctor. Plaintiffs own affidavit states that "the wind was strong, a
high wind," with gusts up to "40 or so miles per hour," strong enough that she "felt the
wind buffet [her] car a bit." (R. 180.) She testified that as she walked toward the
hospital entrance and stepped onto the outside doormat, "the wind blew part of it up and
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it caused [her] to fall." (Id, 1f 5.) While it is unclear exactly how plaintiff fell, the parties
agree that her fall was caused by a sudden gust of wind that lifted the edge of the mat.1
Hospital employees responded to the scene and helped plaintiff into the hospital.
(R. 55-56.) Plaintiff claims permanent injuries resulting from the fall, but the record
contains no evidence of such claims. (Plaintiffs brief, page 11, cites her affidavit, but
the affidavit does not refer to resulting injuries, R. 179.) In any event, plaintiffs claimed
injuries are not material to the legal issue of liability on this appeal.
The doormat on which plaintiff fell was a standard commercial-grade mat, four
feet by thirteen feet, made of indoor/outdoor carpet with rubberized backing to avoid
slippage. It was manufactured by the 3-M Company for both indoor and outdoor use.
The primary consideration in purchasing the mat was safety. The vendor demonstrated
the stability of the mat by placing blowers at its edge and running wheelchairs over it to
show that it would not blow or slide. The mat was designed and intended to be of
sufficient length to allow enough steps for visitors' shoes to be cleaned of dirt and water
before entering the hospital, for sanitation as well as safety. As an added precaution,

Just how the doormat caused plaintiff to fall is not clear, and various accounts differ. One witness
affidavit submitted by plaintiff states that the wind "was blowing pretty hard," and that as plaintiff
approached the mat, "a gust of wind picked up the mat and hit her in the legs." (Burr Aff t, R. 169.)
Another witness said "the wind just picked up the rug and caught her." (Parker Aff t, R. 177.) These
same witnesses told the hospital's incident investigator, Richard Stout, that "just before the victim
stepped onto the m a t , . . . the wind blew and picked up the mat, which caused the victim to trip." (R. 56.)
Plaintiffs counsel takes the position that "[w]hile she was on the mat, it lifted and flapped in the wind,
striking her shins." (Amend. Br. of App. 10.) However, whether the mat flapped and tripped plaintiff
before she stepped onto the mat, or flapped against her legs and caused her to fall after she stepped onto
the mat is not material to this appeal, although it could be relevant to the defense of comparative
negligence. For purposes of deciding liability on this appeal, the parties agree on the material fact that
plaintiffs fall was caused by a sudden gust of wind that lifted the edge of the mat.
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another mat of the same type was also used inside the hospital entrance on the tile floor.
This standard mat was also used at other hospitals in the area. This mat was sold to the
hospital in 1990, with a useful life of eight to ten years. During the five years it was in
use prior to plaintiffs fall, the hospital conducted regular monthly inspections of the mat
and surrounding premises, as part of normal risk management procedures, to look for
damaged carpet or tile or any dangerous condition that could cause an accident. No such
danger was ever observed or reported. (Deposition of Idella Warren 4-20, R. 160-64;
First Affidavit of Ann Anderson,ffif3-6, R. 28-29; Oral Findings, R. 251-52.)
During the time the subject doormat was in use prior to plaintiffs fall, the hospital
never received any information, report, or notice that the mat had been lifted or flapped
by the wind, or that any person had fallen or tripped or had any other accident on the mat.
(First Anderson Aff t, % 4, R. 29; Second Affidavit of Ann Anderson,ffij3-6, R. 222-23;
Deposition of Richard L. Stout 18, R. 150; Deposition of Ann Anderson 45-46, R. 15556; Warren Dep. 17-20, R. 164.)

2

Plaintiff sued the hospital, alleging negligence in selection and use of the doormat.
(R. 1-2.) The hospital initially moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
lifting of the mat by the wind should be considered an "act of God," thereby precluding a
2

Plaintiffs claim that Idella Warren and Ann Anderson "both observed that [the mat] had become
light and limber and was obviously unsafe in wind" (Amend. Br. of App. 13) is misleading, as it is based
on plaintiffs characterization of their remedial action in placing the mat sideways following the report of
plaintiffs fall Both testified that they took this remedial action simply as a precaution to avoid any risk
of reoccurrence. (Warren Dep. 10, R. 162; Anderson Dep. 56-57, R. 157-58.) Neither testified that the
mat was then "unsafe," or, more importantly, that they had any reason to suspect the mat was unsafe
prior to plaintiffs fall In any event, "evidence of the subsequent [remedial] measures is not admissible
to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event [at issue]." Rule 407, Utah R. Evid.
4

finding of causation against the hospital. (R. 19-26.) However, the district court denied
that motion because of a supposed material fact dispute over the strength of the wind.
(R. 101-02, Add. 8-9.) The court specifically reserved for subsequent motion the
question of the hospital's notice of a dangerous condition. (Id.) The hospital filed a
second motion for summary judgment on the basis that it had no prior notice of a
dangerous condition with the doormat. (R. 91-100.) Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment on liability and also requested Rule 11 sanctions on the grounds that
the hospital's two motions were not supported by the law. (R. 130-46.) The district
court granted summary judgment to the hospital on the grounds that it had no prior notice
the mat could flip up in the wind; accordingly, the hospital breached no duty to plaintiff.
(R. 294-95, Add. 2; Oral Findings, R. 253, Add. 7.) Plaintiff appealed that final order to
the Utah Supreme Court (R. 300), which subsequently transferred the case to this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Property owners are not the insurers of those who come upon their premises.
Thus, in order for plaintiff to recover, she must show not only an injury, but also some
basis for a finding of negligence.
Slip-and-fall cases are divided into two classes. Under the first class, involving an
unsafe condition that is temporary, the plaintiff must show that the owner knew of the
condition and failed to correct it. Under the second class, involving an unsafe condition
that is permanent or created by the owner, no proof of notice is necessary, but the
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plaintiff must demonstrate that the condition is inherently dangerous and reasonably
foreseeable.
In this case, the allegedly unsafe condition was the brief lifting of the edge of the
doormat by a sudden gust of wind. The district court correctly treated this as a temporary
condition, requiring proof of the hospital's prior notice of the condition. However, the
district court found, and plaintiff conceded, that the hospital had no prior notice of the
mat ever lifting in the wind. Moreover, the hospital had no constructive notice, because
the condition did not exist long enough to have been discovered and remedied by the
hospital.
Plaintiff cannot avoid the notice requirement by arguing that the wind-blown
doormat was a permanent condition or a condition created by the hospital. The doormat
was safe as it was left by the hospital; it was rendered unsafe only by the sudden gust of
wind. Moreover, plaintiff failed to prove that the doormat presented an inherently
dangerous condition that was reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, absent notice of a
dangerous condition, or proof that the condition was reasonably foreseeable, the hospital
was properly awarded summary judgment.
Plaintiff is not entitled to recover costs and attorney fees because she has failed to
show a factual assertion that is unsupported by the record or a legal argument that is
unwarranted by the law.
Accordingly, the order of the district court should be affirmed in all respects.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
HOSPITAL IS NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF'S FALL BECAUSE
THE HOSPITAL HAD NO PRIOR NOTICE OF A DANGEROUS
CONDITION THAT RESULTED WHEN THE WIND SUDDENLY
FLIPPED UP THE EDGE OF THE MAT.

A. Legal Principles.
Utah law governing premises liability for a slip or trip and fall is well established.
As reaffirmed in the recent case of Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476,
478 (Utah 1996), affirming summary judgment for the store owner, a property owner "is
not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and fall," but is charged only with a
duty of reasonable care. Stated otherwise, "property owners are not insurers of the safety
of those who come upon their property, even though they are business invitees." Id. See
also Silcoxv. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah App. 1991); Martin v.
Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977) (affirming directed verdict for
store owner). Thus, to prevail, a plaintiff must prove not only an injury, but that the
injury was caused by negligence.
Utah courts have identified two classes of negligence cases in the slip-and-fall
context. In the first class, the property owner "must have either actual or constructive
knowledge of the hazardous condition." Schnuphase, supra, at 478. This class
"involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on
the floor." Id. In such cases, the owner cannot be held liable for a resulting injury
unless: (A) the owner had "either actual knowledge" of the condition, "or constructive
7

knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that he should have
discovered it;" and (B) "after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise
of reasonable care he should have remedied it." Id. In the second class, the property
owner must be shown to have "created the hazardous condition." Id. The second class
"involves some unsafe condition of & permanent nature," such as the structure of a
building or stairway, or in equipment or machinery, or in the manner of use for which the
owner is responsible. In such cases, "where the defendant either created the condition, or
is responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and no further proof of
notice is necessary." Id. However, the plaintiff must "provide evidence of the
foreseeability of an inherently dangerous condition." Id. at 479. See also Allen v.
Federated Dairy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975).
To illustrate the dichotomy between the two classes of cases, an icy spot on a
sidewalk leading to a store entrance, resulting from snow and cold temperatures, is a
temporary condition that predicates liability on knowledge of the store owner. Martin v.
Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). Similarly, a rock on the
defendant's steps, Hampton v. Rowley Builder's Supply, 350 P.2d 151 (Utah 1960), or
any matter of foreign substance on a store floor is considered a temporary condition that
requires a showing of the owner's notice to establish liability. See Schnuphase v.
Storehouse Markets, supra (ice cream dropped by a customer); Allen v. Federated Dairy
Farms, supra (cottage cheese sample dropped by a customer); Long v. Smith Food King
Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973) (pumpkin pie sample dropped on the floor); Koer v.
8

May fair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) (grape dropped on the floor). By contrast,
an inclined terrazzo entryway that becomes wet and slippery in the rain "is part of the
permanent structure of the building," requiring the exercise of reasonable care to remove
the hazard through placement of a mat or abrasive material during wet weather. De
Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah 1956).3 Likewise, when a store
owner's chosen method of display and selling creates a situation that is likely to result in
a slippery substance, such as lettuce, being dropped to the floor, the owner's notice of a
dangerous condition is not relevant. Canfieldv. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1227
(UtahApp. 1992).
As demonstrated below, the present case is more analogous to, and fits within, the
first category of cases, requiring proof of notice of the hazardous condition.
B. Application to Present Case.
The present case falls into the first class of slip-and-fall cases because the unsafe
condition that caused plaintiffs fall was the wind-blown doormat, a condition of a
temporary nature for which fault cannot be imputed to the hospital. The mat itself was
not dangerous in its typical flat position; it became temporarily dangerous only when a
gust of wind suddenly lifted its edge just as plaintiff stepped onto it. The mat resumed its
innocuous flat position when the wind subsided. There is no evidence that the mat had

3

De Weese does not fall neatly into either class of cases defined above. The court presents the facts
and issues with reference to the structural aspects of the entryway, but then applies a "notice" analysis
that is consistent with a class-one case. Given its form of analysis, De Weese actually supports treating
the doormat in this case as a class-one condition, making plaintiffs reliance on the case unpersuasive. In
any event, it is mentioned here only for purposes of illustration.
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ever been lifted or flipped up by the wind before that day, or at anytime during that day
prior to plaintiffs fall. Accordingly, the hazardous condition was temporary and not of
the hospital's making. The district court so ruled:
The dangerous condition in this matter was not the rug per se, but it
was a rug that would be susceptible to high gusts . . . of wind that
happened, lift it and flap it in the wind, thus causing someone to fall upon
it.
The Court is of the opinion that this fall is within the temporary
category rather than the permanent category.... [T]his is a temporary
condition in that the —the use of the carpeting was for the safety of ingress
and egress, to keep a dry area that people can go in and out of the hospital.
The condition was of a temporary one in that the wind situation did not
permanently create it, but created it only as to the gusts that were strong
enough to move it. [R. 251.]
Because the hazardous condition was temporary and not caused by the hospital,
the plaintiff was properly required to show prior notice of the condition to establish
liability. However, plaintiff concedes that she "produced no evidence that Defendant had
actual knowledge the mat was unsafe." (Amend. Br. of App. 14.) This admission
follows the district court's express oral ruling:
[I]t appears uncontested that prior to the unfortunate incident in this
case here, there was absolutely no notice at all and no indication that
defendants were put on any notice that that condition was dangerous as to
the condition which caused the fall in this matter, i.e., dangerous as to its
flapping in a wind gust, thus causing the plaintiff, or any other person, to
fall as a result of that flapping. [R. 253.]
Absent proof of notice of the temporary hazard, the district court correctly granted
summary judgment to the hospital. (Id.)

10

The district court's holding and analysis are in accordance with the analogous case
of Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., supra. There, the plaintiff slipped and fell on an icy
spot on a sidewalk leading to the store entrance. The evidence showed that snow had
fallen intermittently through the day; however, store employees had cleared and salted
the sidewalk, leaving it wet but not icy. The ice spot had formed subsequently, without
being observed by anyone. The court affirmed a directed verdict for the store because
there was no evidence that its employees had notice of the ice spot or an opportunity to
remove it. 565 P.2d at 1140-41. The court reasoned that owners of buildings with
public access "are not insurers against all forms of accidents" and have no duty "to mop
the sidewalk dry or take other steps necessary to prevent the accumulation of moisture on
the sidewalk that might freeze and create an icy condition." Id. at 1141.
Similarly, the hospital in the present case, having placed an outdoor mat for the
safety of visitors and sanitation of the hospital, cannot be expected to eliminate all risk of
weather-related hazards, particularly a temporary hazard of which it had no prior notice.
The sidewalk in Martin was not permanently or structurally unsafe; rather, it was
rendered temporarily unsafe by the weather-caused accumulation and freezing of water.
Likewise, the hospital's doormat was not permanently or inherently unsafe; it was
rendered temporarily unsafe by the sudden gust of wind that lifted its edge under
plaintiffs step. Accordingly, the temporarily wind-blown mat is more analogous to ice
on a sidewalk, as in Martin, or food dropped on a floor, as in Schnuphase, than to the
permanent, inclined terrazzo entry in De Weese or the hazardous sales display in
11

Canfield. Therefore, the court correctly granted judgment as a matter of law. 4
C. Plaintiffs Arguments on Classification and Constructive Notice.
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred by treating this as a class one case,
involving a temporary condition, rather than as a class two case, involving a permanent
condition or hazard created by the property owner. (Amend. Br. of App. 23-28.)
However, plaintiffs argument finds no support in the case law.
Plaintiff relies primarily on Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah
App. 1992), in which the plaintiff slipped and fell on a lettuce leaf near a lettuce display
in the store. This Court applied the class-two principles, because the owner "chose a
method of displaying and offering lettuce for sale where it was expected that third parties
would remove and discard the outer leaves from heads of lettuce they intended to
purchase." Id. at 1227. Under this method of operation, it was "reasonably foreseeable"
that customers would drop some leaves to the floor and thereby create "a dangerous
condition." Id. Because a dangerous condition was reasonably foreseeable, the owner's
notice of that condition was "not relevant"; rather, the issue was whether the owner "took

Because the hospital's doormat is not inherently unsafe, but was rendered so only by the sudden
gust of wind, this Court could also affirm the summary judgment on the alternative basis of superseding
natural cause. See, e.g., Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) (appellate court
may affirm summary judgment on any proper ground, even though not relied on below). For example, in
Morril v. Morril, 142 A. 337 (N.J. 1928), a young boy was injured on the defendant's property when a
garage door was blown open by the wind and the previously broken latch hit him in the eye. The court
ruled as a matter of law that the defendant had no duty to anticipate that the wind would blow the door
open; accordingly, the proximate cause of the injury was not the existence of the broken door, or the
owner's failure to fix the door latch, but the wind. The "innocuous act of ownership" cannot be held "to
comprehend the unanticipated and unexpected blast of wind which it is conceded blew the door open."
Id. at 340. "Where the alleged negligent act is separate from the injury done by the intervention of...
the forces of nature, there can be no recovery." Id. at 341.
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reasonable precautions to protect customers against the dangerous condition it created."
Id
However, Canfield is easily distinguishable from the present case because plaintiff
here presented no evidence that the hospital created a dangerous condition merely by
placing this standard doormat at its entry; rather, placement of an outside doormat is a
standard safety precaution. The mat enhances safety; it does not create inherent danger.
"If [the hospital's] duty required further safety measures, we are made to wonder what
they would be, and how far the defendant would have to go in protecting the customers,
both in method and in area. There does not appear to be any reasonable and practical
answer to that inquiry." Long v. Smith Food King Store, supra, 531 P.2d at 362
(affirming summary judgment for slip on pie). The hospital no more created a dangerous
condition by merely placing a doormat than did the store owner in Martin in pouring a
concrete sidewalk that later became slippery in a snowstorm. It is not the mat or the
sidewalk that is dangerous, but the natural elements acting on the mat or sidewalk. In
either condition, the hazard is temporary, and liability must be based on notice. See
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, supra, 918 P.2d at 479 (rejecting application of
second theory of liability to slip on ice cream because merely allowing customers to eat
ice cream in the store does not create a dangerous condition).
Canfield is also distinguishable in that the plaintiff here produced no evidence that
a dangerous condition was reasonably foreseeable. Plaintiff asserts that the blowing of
the mat "obviously did not happen for the first time on the day of Plaintiff s fall."
13

(Amend. Br. of App. 26.) However, this assertion is mere conjecture, not based on
evidence. Plaintiff concedes that the hospital had no prior notice of such an occurrence.
(Id. at 28.) The hospital tested the mat for stability in wind and regularly inspected the
mat for signs of danger; no danger was ever indicated. Given the absence of any prior
notice of the mat flipping up in the wind, a dangerous condition was not reasonably
foreseeable. As the court held in Schnuphase, supra, Canfield is limited to situations in
which the owner creates "an inherently dangerous condition" that is reasonably
foreseeable. 918 P.2d at 479. "[I]nherent danger and foreseeability remain essential
elements of the claim" in the second class of cases. Id. The owner in Schnuphase did
not create a foreseeable danger simply by selling ice cream to customers who could
foreseeably drop some on the floor. Id. Because the plaintiff "failed to present evidence
of the foreseeability of an inherently dangerous condition," summary judgment was
proper. Id. Similarly, in this case Canfield has no application because plaintiff has
presented no evidence of a reasonably foreseeable inherent danger. By merely placing a
mat at its entry, the hospital could not reasonably have foreseen that the mat would be
blown by the wind so as to knock a visitor down. Therefore, this is not a class-two case,
and the class-one requirement of notice of the danger applies. Because plaintiff
admittedly failed to prove notice of a dangerous condition, summary judgment was
appropriate.5

5

Plaintiff also cites De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 P.2d 898 (Utah 1956), for the proposition that
a weather-related hazard should not be treated as a temporary condition. (Amend. Br. of App. 31-32.)
There, the owner was held liable for the plaintiffs slip and fall on an inclined terrazzo entrance that had
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Finally, plaintiff argues that the hospital had constructive notice of a dangerous
condition because "the mat had been unsafe for some time," and the hospital should have
discovered the danger and remedied it. (Amend. Br. of App. 29.) However, as shown
above, plaintiff has presented no evidence that the mat was inherently unsafe. Rather
than evidence, plaintiff offers only conjecture. The mere fact that the mat was more
limber in the fifth year of its ten-year life than in its first year does not prove the mat was
inherently unsafe. Again, what rendered this mat temporarily unsafe was the sudden and
brief gust of wind that lifted its edge under plaintiffs step. That condition was so brief
that no action by the hospital could have prevented the accident. Moreover, plaintiff has
identified no feasible remedy that would not create other hazards. As the district court
held:
The evidence as to the age of the mat, testing performed at the time
the mat was purchased, and the regular inspections of the premises
conducted by defendant, shows, without dispute, that defendant did not
have constructive knowledge that the mat had or would flip in the wind and
create an unsafe condition. [R. 295, Add. 2.]
In summary, the wind-blown doormat was a temporary condition of which the
hospital had no actual or constructive knowledge. Nor did the doormat constitute an

become wet and slippery in the snow. However, liability was based on the facts that "[t]he terrazzo
surfacing is part of the permanent structure of the building," and that "the defendant knew of the
characteristic of terrazzo to become slippery when wet." Id. at 901. Accordingly, De Weese simply
stands for the rule, followed in Canfield, that a property owner "is deemed to be informed of the
dangerous condition" that foreseeably results from the owner's chosen method of operation. Canfield,
supra, at 1226. It does not support the proposition that all weather-related hazards are permanent, or that
a property owner is deemed to know of all weather-related hazards on the property. See Martin v.
Safeway Stores Inc., supra (icy spot on sidewalk treated as temporary condition that required proof of
notice).
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inherently dangerous condition that was reasonably foreseeable, so as to render proof of
notice unnecessary. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to
the hospital. 6
POINT II:

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO FEES AND COSTS UNDER
RULE 11.

Plaintiff argues that, based on Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., she is entitled to recover
her litigation costs and attorney fees incurred in defending the motions below and in
pursuing this appeal. (Amend. Br. of App. 35-38.) However, plaintiff presents no legal
basis for such a recovery.
Under Rule 11, an attorney who files any paper certifies that the paper is not
presented for an improper purpose, that legal arguments are warranted by existing law,
and that factual contentions have evidentiary support. (Add. 10.) Plaintiff argues that
the hospital's motions were "wrong" on the facts and law, and that the hospital should be
sanctioned for persuading the district court and "causing" this appeal. (Amend. Br. of
6

While the hospital is sympathetic to plaintiffs plight, not every injury justifies a monetary
recovery. As observed in Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., supra, 565 P.2d at 1142:
Not every accident that occurs gives rise to a cause of action upon which the
party injured may recover damages from someone. Thousands of accidents occur every
day for which no one is liable in damages, and often no one is to blame, not even the
ones who are injured. The character or extent of an injury may have no bearing upon the
question of the liability therefor; neither has the wealth nor the poverty of either party to
such a litigation anything to do with the question of liability for the accident.
Plaintiff cites Lopez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 932 P.2d 601 (Utah 1997), for the proposition that she
"established a prima facie case of negligence" and was therefore entitled to summary judgment. (Amend. Br. of
App. 32.) However, Lopez deals with statutory liability of a railroad for a train striking a railroad worker. It has no
possible application to the present case. Both parties' motions for summary judgment were properly considered
under the cases discussed above.
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App. 38.) However, plaintiff identifies no specific fact that was presented by the hospital
without record support. Moreover, the legal arguments urged by the hospital were
obviously warranted by the law, as the district court accepted and followed them. The
hospital should not now be punished for prevailing. Even the arguments on the act-ofGod theory were warranted by existing law. (R. 24.) The motion was denied only
because of a material fact dispute. (R. 102.) Accordingly, the district court correctly
denied plaintiffs request for attorney fees (R. 296, Add. 3), and this Court should affirm
that denial. Plaintiff has cited no authority for recovery of costs and fees by the losing
party.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the order of the district court
granting summary judgment to the hospital, and denying summary judgment to plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted this * £ ^

clay of March, 1998.

KIRTON & McCONKIE

By: T ^ ^ C ^ g ^ *& ^<^^r^
Charles W. Dahlquist, II
Merrill F. Nelson
David J. Hardy
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
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Charles W. Dahlquist, II (A0798)
David J. Hardy (A5963)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CATHERINE L. DURBOROW,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 950905016PI

IHC HOSPITALS, INC., COTTONWOOD
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendant.

This matter has came before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of
defendant Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center. Defendant submitted memoranda in support
of the Motion and Plaintiff submitted memoranda opposing the Motion. In connection with her
opposition, plaintiff also filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. A hearing on
the Motion for Summary Judgment was held September 23, 1996, with Samuel King and

OOOOOl

David J. Friel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff and David J. Hardy appearing on behalf of
defendant. At that hearing, plaintiff withdrew her Counter Motion.
Following the court's ruling in favor of defendant on the Motion for Summary
Judgment, plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment and to Grant Her Motions.
Plaintiff and defendant filed memoranda in support of and opposing the Motion. A hearing on
this Motion was held on January 10, 1997, with Samuel King and David J. Friel appearing on
behalf of plaintiff and David J. Hardy on behalf of defendant.
For purposes of this motion, the court has resolved doubts concerning questions of fact
in favor of plaintiff and has therefore assumed that plaintiff was injured when a mat on
defendant's property flipped in the wind and caused her to fall. The court further assumes that
the mat flipping in the wind was an unsafe condition.
Based on the record presented, the court finds as follows:
1.

The instrument causing plaintiff to fall, a mat flipping in the wind, was a

condition of a temporary nature arising from the weather;
2.

There is no dispute of fact as to whether defendant had notice that the mat had

or would flip in the wind, as all of the evidence presented to the court shows that defendant
had no notice that the mat had ever previously flipped in the wind;
3.

The evidence as to the age of the mat, testing performed at the time the mat was

purchased, and the regular inspections of the premises conducted by defendant, shows, without
dispute, that defendant did not have constructive knowledge that the mat had or would flip in
the wind and create an unsafe condition.
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WHEREFORE, based on the findings set forth herein and other good cause shown, the
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment
and Grant Her Motions is denied, and Plaintiffs request for an award of attorney fees is
denied.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs claims against IHC Health Services, Inc.
(formerly IHC Hospitals, Inc.) and Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center are dismissed with
prejudice.

i/
DATED this ' '

%

day of January, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

Glenn K. Iwasaki, District Judge

*%?r~
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

This is a case in which it comes

down to whether or not I determine with confidence as to
whether this.was a temporary on a. permanent condition*
And I think the analysis is something more than just the
use of —

just, the employment of a rug outside of the

entrance.
The dangerous condition in this matter was not
the rug per se, but it was a rug that would be
susceptible to high gusts —

to gusts of wind, however

that is determined, and there's a conflict there —

to

gusts of wind that happened, lift it and flap it in the
wind, thus causing someone to fall upon it.
The Court is of the opinion that this fall is
within the temporary category rather than the permanent
category.

And I reference that as to the descriptions

given in the Schnuphase case, vs. Allen, that this is a
temporary condition in that the —

the use of the

carpeting was for the safety o£ ingress and egress, to
keep a dry area that people can go in and out of the
hospital*

The condition was of a temporary one in that

the wind situation did not permanentlycreate it, but
created it only as to the gusts that were strong enough
to move it*
The Court is aware of Mr. King's argument in
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4
that they chose to put it that way? however, at the time
the decision was made to use the carpetingr there was
affidavits in. this case that indicated that a —

certain

tests were used to show that the carpet would not be
"£bvedl''ijx~a""strong-wind•.-t-And,r—JLn_fact^jthera was
affidavits that -indicated .that a. blower was. used, and it
did not change itThe affidavit subsequent to the injury —
don't contest the contents —

I

indicated that it was not

of. the same condition as it was when it was purchased;
however, there- was a warranty to some extent, of which
you could —

reasonably could rely upon it in that the

carpeting was good for ten years.. But it wasn't, in my
recollection, of the facts,, any qualifications as to ten
years being indoor or outdoor ~ It was ten years - And X
stand corrected if that's- the case..
But regardless of which, it was an.
indoor/outdoor carpeting,, which has been -—...which- has
been, conceded more or less- And. the use of that
carpeting did not exceed even, two — well r about
two-thirds of.the life of /-^.even on. air eight-year: aspect
of it,,-.or at least. 75vpercent of £t r on. an eight-year:
aspect of It;; therefore,. Ltl'spresumed,, -then,- ^for::
reasonable people to assume _that still —-/that, it was
atilL wear-worthy at. that time -

000006

IS!

5
I also have to balance who bears the risk of
this matter., And. that's the hardest, question I have to
face- 'If there was any indication, that Cottonwood •-.-.
Hospital had any inkling or notification, whatsoever as to
the condition of this carpeting in a. windr there's- no
question; in my mind that a- motion for summary" judgment
would be denied,. and denied emphaticallyHowever,.; it appears uncontested that prior to
the unfortunate incident in this case here, there was
absolutely no notice at all and no indication that
defendants were put on any notice that that condition was
dangerous as to the condition which caused the fall in
this matterr i»e-r dangerous as to its flapping in a wind
gustr thus causing- the plaintiffr or any other: person, to
fall as ^a. result of that flappingThereforer the finding of the Court is that
this was a. temporary condition; that being* a. temporary
conditionr that prior: notice must be given and shownThe-, plaintiff has- the burden of doing- that- That is
absent in the""recbrdr as farr as: I'm. concerned;: therefore,,
motion for">summary judgment is: granted; on behalf: of
defendant IHC HospitalBoth sides of that' (Inaudible) or sanctions IJI.
this matter-

Both- sides a request for fees and/or

sanctions are denied-

T "find, that there was a
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Charles W. Dahlquist, II (0798)
Randy T. Austin (6171)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant IHC HOSPITAL, INC.
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CATHERINE DURBOROW,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART
AND RESERVING ISSUE FOR
SUBSEQUENT MOTION

IHC HOSPITAL, INC., COTTONWOOD
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant.

Civil No. 950905016 PI
Judae Glenn K. Iwasaki

This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
at a regularly scheduled hearing on Monday, February 12, 1996, at 11:00 a.m. Randy T.
Austin appeared on behalf of the Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. and Cottonwood Medical
Center, and Samuel King appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. The Court having considered
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oral arguments and the memoranda, affidavits, and pleadings in this matter, and being fully
advised in this matter, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment based on the Act of God doctrine

is denied. There is a genuine issue of material facts with regard to whether the wind which
raised the mat at issue in this matter was "unusual and unexpected."
2.

The Court does not reach and specifically reserves for further briefing and

later consideration the question of whether the Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment
due to the fact that it had no notice or knowledge that the mat at issue could be lifted by
winds.
3.

The Defendant may in its discretion file an additional motion for Summary

Judgment on the Notice iss\i£.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Samuel King
Attorney for Plaintiff
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

the papers should not be deemed to violate the
rule merely because they were prepared in a
dot matrix printer. As currently written, this
paragraph also removes any confusion concerning the top margin and left margin requirements (now 2 inches and 1 inch respectively),
and this paragraph imposes new requirements
for right and bottom margins (both one-half

Rule 11

Paragraph (f). The changes in this paragraph make it clear that the clerk must accept
all papers for riling, even though they may vioi a te the rule, but the clerk may require counsel
to substitute conforming for nonconforming pap e r s rrhQ c l e r k ^ g i y e n d i s c r e t i o n to w a i v e re _
q u i r e m e n t 8 of the rule for parties who are not
r e p r e 8 e n t e d b y ^ ^ j . for good c a u s e shown>

m

£,
i_ / ^ rm_i_ i. • i_ •
the court may relieve parties of the obligation
Paragraph (e). This paragraph, which is an to , 0 ,
... ,,
,
«*.?•*
addition to the rule, requires U e d signature
f ^
™ * * " " * « « V P"* * xt, .
lines and signatures to permanent black or
Compiler's
Notes - Subdivisions (a) to (c)
8 ru e a r e 3 m u a r
blue ink
^
'
to Rule 10, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
p t M «f
' . ,.
TT
ng3
C*tede ^ P
*
1
'
Exhibits.
—Use as pleadings.
While an exhibit may be considered as a part

of a pleading to clarify or explain the same; an
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose
of supplying necessary material averments nor
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983).
Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646
P.2d 727 (Utah 1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117.
C.J.S. —71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98,
371 to 375, 418.
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photographs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322.

Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name
of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369.
Key Numbers. — Pleading •» 4, 13, 15,
38V2 to 75, 307 to 312, 340.

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers;
representations to court; sanctions.
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or,
if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.
Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any.
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being
called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion,
or other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information
or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject
to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attor-
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neys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible
for the violation.
(1) How initiated.
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be
made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe
the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be
served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented
to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such
other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim,
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party
prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees
incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations
committed by its partners, members, and employees.
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter
an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause
why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of
such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject
to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist
of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the
reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of
the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented
party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary
dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party
which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis
for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule
do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1997.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1997
amendments conform state Rule 11 with federal Rule 11. (5ne difference between the rules
concerns holding a law firm jointly responsible
for violations by a member of the firm. Federal
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) states: "Absent exceptional
circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly
responsible for violations committed by its
partners, associates, and employees." Under
the federal rule, joint responsibility is presumed unless the judge determines not to impose joint responsibility. State Rule 11(c)(1)(A)
provides: "In appropriate circumstances, a law
firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, and

employees." Under the state rule, joint responsibility is not presumed, and the judge may
impose joint responsibility in appropriate circumstances. What constitutes appropriate circumstances is left to the discretion of the judge,
but might include: repeated violations, especially after earlier sanctions; firm-wide
sanctionable practices; or a sanctionable practice approved by a supervising attorney and
committed by a subordinate.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment rewrote this rule.
Compiler^ Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 11, F.R.C.P.
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